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CHAPTER 14: EU EQUALITY LAW: FROM PROTECTING ‘GROUPS’ TO 
PROTECTION OF ‘ALL’ 
Dr Jo Milner

 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The extended number of grounds for discrimination identified for protection by Article 
13 of the EC Treaty (inserted by the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, now Article 19 TFEU), 
reflects the emergence and policy recognition of new constituencies based on identity 
politics, such as the gay rights, disability and older peoples‟ movements. This trend 
towards the social (re)construction of group boundaries as intersecting and relational, in 
favour of an understanding of group-defined identity, multiple discrimination, and also 
protection for „all‟, including those who do not fall within legally recognized social 
categories, has been given prominence in various jurisdictions on the international level, 
particularly Canada, South Africa, the USA, and the UK. Growing knowledge of the 
complex legal consequences arising from an increasing number of prohibited grounds, 
which are also intersectional, has led to an emergent debate within global jurisprudence, 
and feminist and critical race socio-legal scholarship, as to where the cut-off line should 
lie between protection for enumerated groups and recognition of individual differences 
and diversity. This has raised the question as to just how extensive and exhaustive such 
lists of grounds should be, and to related discussions comparing the merits of the „open‟ 
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and „inclusive‟ lists of enumerated grounds, often found in constitutional equality 
guarantees, including Canada, South Africa, and the European Convention of Human 
Rights, which accommodate analogous and intersectional grounds, with those of the 
„closed‟ and exhaustive lists found in the EU, USA, and UK. This chapter will first 
examine the origins and development of EU equality legislation and its significant 
expansion of protected grounds, before undertaking a global comparison of the EU, UK, 
US, and Canadian and South African jurisdictions, with a view to evaluating how 
effectively the recent EU Directives on equality can address the phenomenon of multi-
discrimination and accommodate the needs of individuals and/or groups currently 
unprotected.  
 
BACKGROUND  
 
The origins of equality provisions within EU law can be traced back to the 1957 Treaty 
of Rome, and the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC). The Treaty 
and its later amendments comprised the Treaty Establishing the European Community 
(EC Treaty), which has now become the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU). The Treaty centred on creating an internal market by the removal of 
trade barriers preventing the free movement of people, goods and services across 
borders. To this end, discrimination on the basis of „nationality‟ or unequal pay on the 
basis of „gender, with respect to workers of any Member State, was prohibited in Article 
12 EC and Article 141 EC respectively. Yet, Article 141 of the EC Treaty specified that 
the key objectives of the common market were not solely economic, they also sought to 
„ensure social progress and…the constant improvement of living and working 
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conditions‟. Since the 1976 ruling in Defrenne,1 development of European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) case law not only established that the dual economic and social aims 
embraced by the equal pay measures in Article 141 EC were central to the very 
foundation of the community, it also incrementally entrenched and expanded the scope 
of the principle of equality over the following two decades. By 2000, the balance tipped 
towards social justice to a point where the ECJ ruled
2
 this should now be considered a 
fundamental human right, and privileged over economic competitiveness.  
 
However, non-discrimination law focused solely on „nationality‟ and „gender‟ until the 
enactment of Article 13 of the EC Treaty in 1999 (when the Treaty of Amsterdam 
entered into force), which significantly extended the number of grounds for protection, 
and marked a major shift towards the development of a comprehensive body of EU 
equality law. Article 13 EC comprised the basis of four key equality Directives, which 
rapidly ensued. Monaghan
3
 attributes this speed of enactment to persistent lobbying by 
the European Parliament, and the highly effective anti-racism Starting Line Group.
4
 The 
                                                 
1
 Case 43/75, Gabrielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena (Defrenne II) 
[1976] ECR 455; Case 149/77, Gabrielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne 
Sabena (Defrenne III) [1978] ECR 1365. 
2
 Case C-50/96, Deutsche Telekom AG v Lilli Schroder [2000] ECR 1-743. 
3
 K. Monaghan, Equality Law, Oxford: OUP, 2007, p. 115. 
4
 „The very important Starting Line Group was no doubt inspired in selecting its own name by the 
comment of the European Council on the Joint Declaration Against Racism & Zenophobia, signed by the 
European Parliament, Commission and Council, that this was not a “starting point for concrete action.”‟ 
Ibid, p. 115. 
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latter, created in 1991 as a largely Anglo– Dutch initiative,5 took just under a decade to 
garner the support of over 400 bodies drawn from across Europe, ranging from non-
governmental organizations, and trade unions, to academic specialists in the field, and 
called for enhanced legal measures to strengthen equality protection within the EU. A 
draft Council Directive outlawing racial discrimination followed; however, the 
Commission was reluctant to authorize such a mandate, which led the Starting Line 
Group to ratchet up it‟s campaign with a renewed focus on changing the EC Treaty to 
reflect the proposals, which were soon after successfully realized in the form of a 
general, as opposed to race-specific, non-discrimination amendment.  
 
The Racial Equality Directive (2000/43/EC) was the first Directive to arise from Article 
13 EC, and required Member States to legislate against discrimination on the grounds of 
racial and ethnic origin within not only employment and vocational training, but social 
security, education and the supply of goods and services. The second enactment, the 
Employment (Framework) Directive (2000/78/EC), now rendered discrimination 
unlawful on the basis of religion and belief, disability, sexual orientation and age, but its 
scope only covered employment and vocational training. Both Directives hinged on four 
definitions of discrimination (direct and indirect
6
 discrimination, harassment, and 
                                                 
5
 It was formed by the Commission for Racial Equality UK, the Dutch National Bureau against Racism, 
and the Churches Commission for Migrants in Europe. Ibid, p. 117. 
6
 The Race Directive provides that „Indirect discrimination shall be taken to occur where an apparently 
neutral provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of 
achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary‟. Monaghan (2007), op. cit., p. 121, notes this 
progressive amendment, as „it does not require proof of the existence of a rule or condition constituting an 
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instruction and pressure to discriminate) and also required Member States to establish 
national authorities to further equality initiatives. They were closely followed by the 
Gender Employment Directive (2002/73/EC),
7
 which prohibited discrimination between 
men and women in employment and vocational training, and the Gender Goods and 
Services Directive (2004/113/EC),
 8
 which extended protection on the basis of sex to the 
provision of goods and services (excluding education). As Fredman pointed out, the 
material scope of discrimination law within the EU is uneven and hierarchical across the 
grounds, „with race and ethnic origin privileged over gender, which in turn is privileged 
over age, disability, sexual orientation and religion or belief.‟9 The Directives also fell 
short of including any substantive moves towards addressing the underlying causes of 
discrimination through the inclusion of positive obligations. All EU Member States 
were required to have legislative measures in place to cover the listed protected grounds 
in employment by 2003, with the exception of age and disability, which were given 
until 2006 on account of their complexity. However, notwithstanding the recent 
enactment of the UK Equality Act 2010, the variable scope of the EU provisions would 
                                                                                                                                               
absolute bar‟, and therefore, does not now „require proof of a statistical disadvantage‟, nor the need to 
„show actual group disadvantage‟. 
7
 The Equal Treatment Directive 76/207 was repealed in August 2009, and replaced to incorporate ECJ 
case law, and some of the principle elements of the Race and also Employment Framework Directives.  
8
 This led to the 2006 Recast Gender Employment Directive 2006/54/EC which consolidated legal 
provisions which were spread over a number of Directives.  
9
 S. Fredman, „Positive Rights & Positive Duties‟, in D. Scheik and V. Chege (eds), „European Non-
Discrimination Law: Comparative Perspectives on Multidimensional Equality Law‟, London-NewYork: 
Routedge/Cavendish, 2009, p. 74. 
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have failed for instance, to protect two men who faced discrimination when they were 
recently turned away from a UK guest house on account of their sexual orientation.
10
  
 
Yet, the transposition of the EU Directives into the national law of the 27 Member 
States marks a major advance, as „the majority did not possess anti-discrimination 
legislation in respect of disability, age and sexual orientation,‟11 and now nearly all12 
have provisions which outlaw discrimination on these grounds. Bell argues that the 
extent of the influence of the EU Directives „in (re) shaping national law‟ should not be 
underestimated, especially in relation to the 12 new Member States who joined the EU 
post 2004, „for whom anti-discrimination law was likely to be more novel.‟13 Moreover, 
even Member States, such as the UK, who already had a well developed corpus of non-
discrimination provisions, embarked on a series of progressive legislative reforms. In 
respect of the specific example of the UK, as Waddington noted, the transposition posed 
a threat to „the coherency and consistency of a pre-existing system of discrimination 
law.‟14 Although the EU had attempted to equalize the stark differences in the levels of 
protection accorded to its specified grounds, this nonetheless resulted in an anomalous 
situation in the UK, where the amendments to the Race Relations Act 1976 in response 
                                                 
10
 „Gay Couple turned Away from B&B by Christian Owner‟, The Guardian, 21st March, 2010. 
11
 M. Bell, „The Implementation of European Anti-Discrimination Directives: Converging towards a 
Common Model‟, The Political Quarterly 79(1), 2008 (Jan-March), p. 36. 
12
 With the exception of Sweden, which has still to enact age legislation. Ibid. p. 36. 
13
 Ibid. p. 42. 
14
 L. Waddington, „European Developments, Taking Stock & Looking Forward: The Commission Green 
Paper on Equality & Non-Discrimination in an Enlarged European Union,‟ Industrial Law Journal 33, 
2004 (December), p. 367.  
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to the EC Race Directive 2000 led to a reduction in the level of protection accorded to 
the ground of nationality to comply with the Directive.
15
 Furthermore, to meet the 2006 
deadline, the UK also implemented the EC Framework Directives in the form of the 
Race Relations Act 1976 (Amendment) Regulations 2003, the Employment Equality 
(Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003, the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) 
Regulations 2003, and the Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006. Yet, these 
provisions were strongly criticized on a number of levels: from the use of the subsidiary 
legislation for implementation,
16
 and the complexity of the existing framework of non-
discrimination law,
17
 to its failure to reflect the inter-relationship between the grounds, 
and to address the needs of all those who do not fall within the boundaries of the EC list 
of protected groups, and/or those who have multiple and intersecting claims based on 
not just one, but two or more grounds of discrimination.
18
 The twin measures, 
                                                 
15
 M. Bell, „A Patchwork of Protection: the New Anti-Discrimination Law Framework‟, Modern Law 
Review 67(3), 2004, pp. 465-477. 
16
 Legal experts and campaigning organisations criticised the use of s. 2 (2) of the European Communities 
Act 1972, which allows delegated legislation as opposed to primary legislation to be applied to implement 
EC law; I. Leigh and C. Hart, Implementing the EU Employment Directive, London: RICS, 2002, point 
out, that such subsidiary law is first, „cramped‟ as it limits the Government‟s ability to step outside of the 
terms of the Directives, a move which may lead to what could be regarded as an abuse of its powers; 
second, that it cannot be amended, only accepted or rejected as it passes through Parliament; and third, it 
is less robust than an Act of Parliament in the courts, and more subject to attack. 
17
 The then Labour Government undertook a 12 month review of the complex raft of existing equality 
legislation and guidance (currently comprising 35 acts, 52 statutory instruments and 13 codes of practice), 
with a view to establishing „a simpler and fairer legal framework.‟ P. Grattan et al., „Comment & 
Analysis: Letters: Fight for Equality‟, The Guardian, 26 February 2005. 
18
 S. Fredman, „Equality: A New Generation‟, Industrial Law Journal 30, 2001, p. 145. 
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comprising the UK Equality & Human Rights Commission (EHRC), a single equality 
authority,
19
 and the (Single) Equality Bill, now the UK Equality Act 2010,
20
 (which 
entered into force in Autumn 2010), were developed to meet these challenges. 
 
THE PROLIFERATION OF GROUNDS FOR DISCRIMINATION 
 
The extended number of grounds for discrimination identified for protection by Article 
13 of the EC Treaty is indicative of the emergence and policy recognition of new 
constituencies based on identity politics, such as women‟s, black, gay rights, disability 
and older people‟s movements which have challenged the deeply embedded, 
stereotypical assumptions of „normality‟, based on the hegemony of the nuclear family 
headed by an able-bodied white male. The rapid proliferation of protest groups and their 
subsequent fragmentation into further sub-groups,
21
 has led to an ongoing process of 
negotiation and re-negotiation of their boundaries. Their status as discrete and 
unambiguous social categories are now contested and have led a number of critical 
                                                 
19
 The Equality and Human Rights Commission amalgamated the previous Equal Opportunities 
Commission (EOC), the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE), and the Disability Rights Commission 
(DRC). 
20
 The UK Equality Act 2010 has now replaced the complex raft of previous equality legislation and 
guidance, and extends protection for all the grounds beyond the provisions of Employment (Framework) 
Directive (2000/78/EC) to cover social security, education and the supply of goods and services. 
21
 Such as the Royal National Institute for Deaf People (RNID), which has separated itself from the main 
disability movement, by arguing that although deaf people are impaired they are not disabled.  
 9 
theorists
22
 to argue that groups should not be considered in essentialist terms, that is as 
in some way biologically fixed, unalterable and homogeneous, but rather as sharing 
cross-cutting differences and affinities. Yet, this trend also reflects an inherent tension, 
as many of these groups, for reasons of political expediency, have been organized 
around, and have successfully campaigned upon, unitary, essentialist representations of 
their identity, which are expressed as mutually exclusive, rather than as relational and 
fluid categories. 
 
To Solanke,
23
 this „single issue focus‟, whilst now out of step with the complex and 
changing backdrop of social reality, has served as a valuable legal tool, as it has 
provided remedies specifically tailored to each separate head of discrimination, which 
may be far from analogous, whether disability, race or gender for instance. Thus it has 
been necessary for each characteristic „to be isolated, and magnified, bracketed from all 
other aspects of identity‟24 and to be articulated in legal terms as the „grounds‟, or bases, 
on which discrimination is prohibited. Bell also highlights the benefits of such a 
pragmatic approach, by explaining that 
 
[...] in order for everyone to be treated equally it is simply necessary that 
irrelevant characteristics, such as gender or race, be removed from the decision 
                                                 
22
 I. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990; P. 
Leonard, Postmodern Welfare: Reconstructing an Emancipatory Project, London: Sage, 1997; M. 
O‟Brien and S. Penna, Theorising Welfare: Enlightenment and Modern Society, London: Sage, 1998. 
23
 I. Solanke, „Putting Race & Gender Together: A New Approach to Intersectionality‟, Modern Law 
Review 72(5), 2009, pp. 723-749. 
24
 Ibid. p. 724. 
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making process. This type of strict rationality has the advantage of being widely 
applicable. Once a given characteristic is deemed inappropriate/irrelevant, then 
the non-discrimination norm can be extended accordingly.
25
 
 
Awareness of the complex legal consequences of the increasing number of prohibited 
grounds of discrimination has led to a debate as to where the cut-off line should lie 
between protection for enumerated groups and recognition of individual differences and 
diversity. This has raised the question as to just how extensive and exhaustive such lists 
of grounds should be. Ireland's Employment Equality Act 1998 covers nine suspect 
grounds, whilst the EU now renders discrimination unlawful on the basis of six grounds 
comprising sex, racial or ethic origin, religion or belief, age, disability and sexual 
orientation, which as Schiek et al. point out, clearly „delimits the scope of the 
application of Community non-discrimination law.‟26 Bell argued that although long 
„elaborate‟ lists of specific groups can „implicitly devalue those grounds not 
mentioned…for the less established grounds, such as sexual orientation, an express 
mention can be a valuable source of affirmation.
27
  
 
                                                 
25
 M. Bell, „Walking in the Same Direction: The Contribution of the European Social Charter & the EU to 
Combating Discrimination‟, in G. de Burca and B. de Witte (eds), Social Rights in Europe, Oxford: OUP- 
Hart Publishing, 2003, p. 93. 
26
 D. Schiek, L. Waddington, and M. Bell (eds), Cases, Materials & Text on National, Supranational & 
International Non-Discrimination Law, Oxford & Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007, p. 4. 
27
 M. Bell, „Equality and the European Union Constitution‟, Industrial Law Journal 33, 2004 
(September), p. 244. 
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Whilst the EU, UK and Ireland‟s lists of grounds are examples of closed and exhaustive 
obligations on the one hand, Article 14 of the European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR) which ensures that the Convention‟s rights are guaranteed, „without 
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, 
birth, or other status,‟ is on the other hand an example of an alternative open and non-
exhaustive list. Although open systems of grounds are normally found in constitutional 
level guarantees and human rights treaties, such as Article 14 ECHR
28
 and Article 1 of 
Protocol 12 to the ECHR,
29
 Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR),
30
 and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
31
 such 
non-exhaustive lists can also be found in the national non-discrimination legislation of a 
number of EU Member States including Finland, Latvia, Poland and Slovenia.
32
  
 
Sheppard points out that a comparison between the Quebec Charter of Human Rights 
and Freedoms, a closed system, and the „open‟ Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms shows that although the former is more comprehensive, the latter „leaves 
                                                 
28
 Article 14 is not a freestanding Convention right, this guarantee only extends to equal enjoyment of the 
other Convention rights and freedoms.  
29
 This was adopted in 2000 and has been in force since 2005; it offers a freestanding right to non-
discrimination, but by August 2010 only 19 out of the 47 Council of Europe Member States had ratified 
it.  
30
 Article 2(2) of International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), on the other 
hand, is less specific, and only requires that states ensure „the rights enunciated in the present Convention 
will be exercised without discrimination of any kind.‟ See Schiek et al. (2007), op. cit., p. 8. 
31
 Adopted in 1982 as a constitutional „Bill of Rights‟. 
32
 Solanke (2009), op. cit., p. 723. 
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open the possibility that analogous grounds can be added through judicial interpretation 
and application.‟33 However, just as the non-exhaustive, open-ended list might have 
sufficient flexibility to reflect changing societal trends in respect of outlawing new 
„irrelevant‟ grounds of discrimination, such as genetic endowments or social caste, Bell 
argues that  
 
[...] the very openness of this notion of equality leads to accusations that it is an 
empty vessel, differences in treatment are only discriminatory if the ground for 
differential treatment is irrelevant, but it is a constantly shifting and expanding 
list.
34
 
 
Yet, a clear drawback with the grounds-based, especially the closed system, is that no 
matter how long the list of prohibited categories might be, as Iyer claims, it „obscures 
the complexity of social identity in ways that are damaging both to particular rights 
claimants, and to the larger goal of redressing social relations of inequality.‟35 This issue 
is considered below.  
 
MULTIPLE GROUNDS FOR DISCRIMINATION 
 
One important consequence arising from the rapid expansion of protected non-
discrimination grounds has been the increased potential for the number of claims by 
                                                 
33
 C. Sheppard, „Grounds of Discrimination: Towards an Inclusive and Contextual Approach‟, Canadian 
Bar Review 80, 2001, p. 895. 
34
 Bell (2003), op.cit., p. 93. 
35
 N. Iyer, 1993, cited in E. McColgan, „Reconfiguring Discrimination‟, Public Law, Spring 2007, p. 77. 
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individuals who argue that their experiences are not reducible to a single, discrete 
category. Rather, they would prefer to seek redress for experiences of adverse treatment 
they feel falls into two or more categories, such as „race‟ and „religious belief‟ for 
instance, which may more accurately reflect their reality. However, multiple claims for 
discrimination conflict with the existing EU legislative framework aimed at outlawing 
discrimination, which is based on unitary social characteristics, such as the Racial 
Equality Directive and the Employment (Framework) Directive of 2000, and the Gender 
Employment Directive of 2002. The difficulties of pursuing an intersectional claim 
under these Directives (given their variable material scope), where the Racial Equality 
Directive has the most extensive coverage and the Employment (Framework) Directive 
the least, are highlighted by Fredman, on the basis that this would render it problematic 
for people who were discriminated against on more than one ground, if one was less 
protected than the other, such as „older members of ethnic minorities who wish to bring 
a claim of multi-discrimination relating to health care or housing. Such claimants, 
would only have a claim on the grounds of ethnic origin.‟36 
 
Moreover, the exhaustive scope of the EU grounds was strongly underlined by the ECJ 
ruling in Chacon Navas (2006)
37
 where it was held that „sickness‟ under the mandate of 
the Employment (Framework) Directive did not constitute a „disability‟, nor could it be 
considered an „additional‟ ground in respect to the listed classifications. Yet, the 
inflexibility of this ruling does not chime with the preambles in both the Racial Equality 
                                                 
36
 Fredman (2009), op. cit., p. 3. 
37
 Case C-13/05, Chacon Navas v Eurest Colectividades SA [2006] ECR 1-6467. 
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Directive
38
 and Employment (Framework) Directive
39
 which state that when 
implementing equal treatment, the Community should „aim to eliminate inequalities and 
promote equality between men and women, especially since women are often victims of 
multiple discrimination.‟40 Notwithstanding the inclusion of multiple discrimination in 
the above EU Directives, this term has been largely confined to soft law, and the 
concepts of „multiple discrimination‟ and „intersectionality‟ have not been legally 
defined by the EU „in contrast to other equality concepts such as direct and indirect 
discrimination, harassment and sexual harassment.‟41  
 
A GLOBAL COMPARISON OF ‘CLOSED’ VERSUS ‘OPEN’ LISTS OF 
PROTECTED GROUNDS 
 
Having grown belatedly as a response to consistent lobbying, and to counter the 
resurgence of the Austrian far-right in the late 1990s, the development of the current 
body of EU non-discrimination law owes much to the earlier Anglo-Dutch models of 
law which inspired and pre-figured it. This discussion will therefore now turn to the 
emergence and growth of equality protections within the UK and the USA (both of 
which are older jurisdictions with respect to anti-discrimination provisions, and which 
like the EU have „closed‟ lists of protected grounds), as they relate to the principle of 
                                                 
38
 Directive 2000/43/EC Recital 14. 
39
 Directive 2000/78/EC Recital 3. 
40
 Solanke (2009), op. cit., p. 725. 
41
 R. Nielsen, „Is EU Equality Law Capable of Addressing Multiple and Intersectional Discrimination 
Yet? Precautions Against Neglecting Intersectional Cases‟, in Schiek and Chege, op. cit., p. 32, notes, 
„the term “intersectionality” is not explicitly used in EU legislation, soft law, or case law.‟ 
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equal treatment and multi-discrimination,
42
 before moving on to contrast these with the 
newer Canadian and South African jurisdictions, which comprise „open‟ lists of equality 
protections, with a view to better understanding the current challenges faced by the EU.  
 
UK and USA: ‘Closed’ Lists of Grounds  
 
The UK‟s fragmentary body of non-discrimination law based on identity characteristics, 
typically reflects the emergence and chronology of identity politics, which as it 
developed over time, applied pressure, and shaped legislation on a ground by ground, 
and unitary basis. As Schiek et al. observe, this „ground-specific‟ developmental 
approach is most notable in common law countries „which results in a patchwork 
character to the law.‟43 Although the separate statutes comprising the Equal Pay Act 
(EqPA) 1970, the Sex Discrimination Act (SDA) 1975, the Race Relations Act (RRA) 
1976, and the 1995 Disability Discrimination Act (DDA), shared common and 
overlapping elements, such as the need to demonstrate „direct‟ or „indirect‟ 
discrimination, they each had separate sets of mechanisms for dealing with allegations. 
This issue came to the fore in Mandla v Dowell Lee
44
 which centred on whether Sikhs 
constituted an „ethnic group‟ under the terms listed in the s. 3 RRA , which outlawed 
discrimination on the grounds of „colour, race, nationality and ethnic or national origin.‟ 
In searching for a test which separated ethnicity from religion, Lord Frazer found a 
                                                 
42
 The EU favours the term „multiple discrimination‟ over „intersectionality.‟ 
43
 Schiek, Waddington, and Bell (2007), op. cit., p. 5.  
44
 [1983] IRLR 209. 
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definition framed in the New Zealand case King-Ansell v Police,
45
 which rested on an 
essentialist conceptualization of groups as having fixed boundaries, rather than flexible 
or permeable boundaries. Ethnic groups, it was held, had a long historical and shared 
cultural tradition of beliefs, customs, language, geographical origin and/or religion 
which has served to give them a distinctive and separate social identity. This test 
therefore enabled Jews,
46
 Sikhs and Gypsies
47
 to fall within the tightly specified 
definition of an ethnic group, whilst Rastafarians
 
and Muslims did not. In Walker v 
Hussain
48
 for instance, Pitt observes, that although it was not explicit, the rationale for 
excluding Muslims from the definition of ethnic group would be „that Islam, like 
Christianity, is so widespread that it is not possible to identify any common 
characteristic among its adherents beyond their religious faith.‟49 
 
If another social category is closely examined, for instance „age‟ – i.e., progression 
throughout the life-course – it is clear that it is a universal experience, shared by 
everyone. It therefore intersects with all other groupings of social identity, and cannot 
be easily reduced to a discrete construct, and thus, may be more likely to be 
conceptualized as part of a multiple-discrimination claim. As Fredman explains, „The 
basic opposition between “self” and “other” which marks much of racism and sexism is 
                                                 
45
 [1979] 2 NZLR 53. 
46
 Seide v Gillette Industries [1980] IRLR 427. 
47
 CRE v Dutton [1989] QB 783. 
48
 [1996] ICR 291. 
49
 G. Pitt, Employment Law, London: Thomson, Sweet & Maxwell, 2004, p. 27. 
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not present in the same way.‟50 Age discrimination, for example, can be so closely 
intertwined with sex
51
 discrimination and/or race
52
 discrimination, that there has been 
ambiguity as to whether the head of discrimination is gender, race or age. This was 
highlighted in Ruthford & Bentley v Secretary of State for Trade & Industry.
53
 The case 
centred on whether the upper qualifying age of 65 years for bringing a claim of unfair 
dismissal was contrary to Article 141 EC Treaty, as it indirectly disadvantaged „a 
substantially higher‟ proportion of men than women.54 The UK Court of Appeal held 
that it did not, on the basis of statistical evidence reappraised to include the entire 
workforce in the pool.
 
 
Non-discrimination law in the UK and the US has, therefore, been structured around the 
concept of „immutabilty‟, which as Solanke explains is „a permanent and involuntary 
character trait which causes an individual to suffer discrimination.‟55 She points out that 
this idea can be traced to early discussions by the Society of Labour Lawyers in 1965, 
who, when developing the first Race Relations Act, argued that „the law should protect 
                                                 
50
 S. Fredman, „The Age of Equality‟, in S. Fredman and S. Spencer (eds), Age as an Equality Issue, 
Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003, p. 21. 
51
 Price v Civil Service Commission [1978] 1 All ER 1228. 
52
 Perera v Civil Service Commission (No 2) [1983] ICR 428.  
53
 [2004] 3 CMLR 53.  
54
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those attacked for what they are, rather than what they may believe or do.‟56 Such an 
essentialist construct of social identity, therefore, does little to accommodate social 
characteristics which are „mutable‟, that is, which are not voluntary and do not neatly fit 
within the tightly specified definitions of „sex‟, „race‟ or „disability‟, for instance. 
Accordingly, whilst differences between groups are highlighted, differences within 
groups are invisible. There are two main ways in which multiple discrimination can 
occur: where the grounds of discrimination are „additive‟; and where it is based on an 
inextricable combination of two or more characteristics, which has been described as 
„cumulative‟ or „intersectional‟ discrimination, a critique advanced in the 1980‟s by 
feminist legal theorist Kimberle Crenshaw.
57
 Whereas the former describes the situation 
where experiences of oppression are fragmented into essentialist, unitary categories, 
such as „sexism‟ plus „racism‟, which suggests that racism is a further, and discrete 
disadvantage, additional to the discrete disadvantage of sexism, the latter „arises out of a 
combination of various oppressions, which together, produce something unique and 
distinct from any one form of discrimination standing alone.‟58 
 
To achieve success in the courts, claimants are required to frame their unequal treatment 
along a single as opposed to a multiple axis, irrespective of how they actually perceived 
their experience. Yet, if they are female and from an ethnic minority for instance, they 
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may feel that they cannot sever the two characteristics, as they amount to an indivisible 
combination, which is quite different from the experience of being either a woman or 
from an ethnic minority. They are thus required to select a specific ground, and exclude 
others, or risk losing the claim. Therefore, claimants tend to plead only one ground even 
when they may have experienced adverse treatment on a number of grounds. This is 
best exemplified by the case of Burton v De Vere Hotels:
59
 Two Afro-Caribbean 
waitresses brought an action against the hotel, as whilst serving at a club dinner for 400 
men, they were indirectly exposed to disparaging sexual and racial jokes by the 
comedian Bernard Manning. This was later followed by a series of very offensive, 
sexualized insulting behaviour and comments directly aimed at them. Yet, the 
successful claim was only brought under the RRA, when it also clearly fell into the 
ambit of the SDA.  
 
When claimants do decide to pursue a claim based on multiple discrimination, Hannett 
argues that the courts tend to „minimise complexity‟ by focusing on one ground and 
overlooking the others, or by adopting an „additive‟ rather than „intersectional‟ 
approach.
60
 In the US, for example, even where a more integrated statute exists, such as 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 1964, in the case DeGraffenreid v General Motors
61
 a 
claim based on intersectional discrimination on the grounds of „race‟ and „sex‟ failed, as 
the court held that „they must choose to bring either a race action or a sex action in order 
to avoid the creation of an unauthorised class which would give black women greater 
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standing and relief.‟ 62 The deciding factor hinged on the risk that a successful outcome 
for black women, who if perceived as a special class, would amount to a new „super-
remedy which would give them relief beyond what the drafters of the relevant statutes 
intended.‟63 A further related problem was coined the „sex-plus‟ concept, where women 
are forced to „choose gender as their principle means of identification, thereby 
perpetuating a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of discrimination 
experienced by black women, most of whom do not consider their race to be secondary 
to their sex.‟ 64 This was illustrated by another US case Jeffries v Harris County 
Community Action Association,
65
 four years later in 1980. Although a multiple 
discrimination claim was now permitted, this was on condition that a claimant was able 
to plead discrimination on the basis of sex, plus an additional characteristic or factor 
related to sex. Yet, by 1986, in Judge v Marsh,
66
 it was held that the „sex-plus‟ concept 
must be limited to just one additional factor, as there was a concern that given the 
complexity of multi-discrimination cases within employment law, it would become „a 
many headed Hydra, with sub-groups existing for every possible combination of race, 
colour, sex, national origin and religion.‟67 
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Moreover, where a claimant alleges multi-discrimination, but one ground, such as „age‟, 
is unprotected, this may undermine the protected ground, and as such the whole claim. 
In the UK case of Pearce v Governing Body of Mayfield School, 
68
 a lesbian teacher was 
subjected to homophobic abuse by pupils and forced out of her job. The claimant argued 
that she had been discriminated against on the basis of her sexual orientation and 
gender, however, as sexual orientation was not protected at that time, she was forced to 
frame her claim in terms of sex discrimination. Yet, this was too narrow in scope, as it 
had been held in Smith v Gardner-Merchant
69
 that it did not include sexual orientation. 
The House of Lords ruled on the basis that as she was not treated differently to a male 
homosexual, her claim did not meet the criteria for sex discrimination. To Hannett  
 
Pearce appeared to be caught in a double bind: she was unable to claim 
discrimination on the basis of her sexual orientation, yet her sexuality resulted in 
an inability to claim sex discrimination in a scenario in which a similarly 
situated heterosexual woman, after Strathcylde Regional Council v Porcelli
70
 
and Insitu Cleaning Co. Ltd v Heads,
71
 would have succeeded.
72
  
 
A further critical issue to arise in multiple or intersectional cases of discrimination, is 
the requirement for symmetry; derived from the Aristotelian idea „that likes should be 
treated alike‟, it encapsulates the principle that „basic fairness requires consistent 
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treatment.‟73 Accordingly, adverse treatment can be best demonstrated by identifying 
someone who has been treated more favourably, in a similar situation. As Bell
74
 points 
out, although a suitable comparator may be pivotal to the success of a claim, this can 
prove problematic, as there may be lack of agreement as to the precise characteristics an 
appropriate comparator should possess, an issue, which may be further exacerbated by 
the complexities of a multi-discrimination claim. The problem of symmetry is not just 
confined to pregnant woman, but the asymmetrical experiences of all those who do not 
conform to normative assumptions of the average legal subject as a white, middle-class 
married male. This was highlighted in Grant v South West Trains,
75
 Croft v Post 
Office
76
 and above-mentioned Pearce v Governing Body of Mayfield School,
77
 where 
there was either disagreement or even failure to identify an appropriate comparator, and 
came to the fore in Bahl v Law Society.
78
 Kamlash Bahl alleged that as an Asian 
woman, she had been discriminated against by her employer, the Law Society, on 
grounds of her race and her sex, on a „single combined‟ and hence, intersectional basis. 
The Court of Appeal, however, overturned the Employment Tribunal (ET) decision 
which had ruled in her favour, on the basis that she could use a „white male‟ 
comparator. Lord Justice Gibson held that the ET had erred  
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[…] as it was necessary…to find the primary facts in relation to each type of 
discrimination against each alleged discriminator and then to explain why it was 
making the inference which it did in the favour Dr Bahl on whom lay the burden 
of proving her case.  
 
Thus, the grounds of gender and race had to be considered separately, on the basis of 
two sets of evidence, and not together as an inextricable claim. This case marked a 
turning point in UK non-discrimination law, as it was clear that unless there was 
legislative reform, such was the rigidity of the „appropriate comparator‟ principle in the 
case law, it was likely to pose a considerable barrier to any future „intersectional‟ 
claims. The recent Equality Act 2010 sought to remedy the foregoing difficulties by 
including a provision for dual discrimination on two combined „intersectional‟ protected 
characteristics. Although the effectiveness of this provision remains to be seen, the Act 
marks a major inroad, which might feed into any proposed European Directive. It aims 
to overcome the comparator problem by accommodating either a „real‟ or hypothetical 
one, but the Act‟s scope in this regard is limited to direct discrimination on the basis of 
just two protected grounds. As Monaghan points out, this  
 
[…] seems difficult to justify [as] the experience of being a mentally unwell 
black man can be very different to the experience of being a mentally ill white 
man or a well black man, or a mentally ill black woman, for all sorts of 
institutional and social reasons.
79
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Clearly, this demonstrates the paradox of the formal equality approach, where according 
to Hannett „it must be recognised…that every difference in treatment may not 
necessarily result in inequality and…that identical treatment may frequently produce 
serious inequality.‟80  
 
Canada and South Africa ‘Open’ Lists of Grounds  
 
The discussion will now turn to the jurisdictions of Canada and South Africa, which by 
contrast to the UK and the US adopt inclusive or „open‟ approaches, which on the one 
hand enumerate „suspect‟ grounds for protection, whilst on the other leave open the 
possibility to add further non-enumerated and analogous grounds. As the Canadian 
Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms of 1982, including Section 15,
81
 has quasi-
constitutional status, and assumes primacy over other legislation, the Canadian Supreme 
Court has ruled that it should be interpreted in a „purposive‟ way, which expresses 
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underlying legislative intent.
82
 This was emphasised in the influential dissenting 
judgement of Madam Justice L’Heureux-Dube, whose argument in Canada (Attorney 
General) v Mossop
83
 took the line that „unless constrained by the clear words of the 
statute, adjudicators should adopt a “living tree” approach to the interpretation of human 
rights laws,‟84 especially, if there was a lack of detailed definition in the legislation. The 
case in question, centred on Mr Mossop, a gay man who claimed discrimination on the 
basis of „family status‟ when he was denied paid bereavement leave by his employer to 
attend his partner‟s father‟s funeral. Although „sexual orientation‟ was not a protected 
characteristic at that time, „family status‟ was; Madam Justice L’Heureux-Dube argued 
that notwithstanding the majority ruling (that there was insufficient evidence to uphold 
protection for this ground alone), „the enumerated grounds of discrimination must be 
examined in the context of contemporary values, not in a vacuum. Their meaning is not 
frozen in time and the scope of each ground may evolve.‟85 This scope for purposive 
judicial reasoning, when combined with a „willingness to interpret the language of the 
statute broadly,‟86 has, as Monaghan noted, „recognised the value in a framework that 
has sufficient flexibility …to accommodate societal changes,‟87 and so offered an 
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opportunity to address the needs of non-traditional groups who do not neatly conform to 
existing often, immutable anti-discrimination categories.  
 
Charter jurisprudence with respect to s. 15 has over time moved away from an explicitly 
symmetrical interpretation of discrimination, which focused on an assessment of the key 
elements of listed and analogous grounds, towards a more contextual analysis, largely 
found in asymmetric open systems. This shift is clearly evident, as Monaghan
88
 
explains, in both R v Turpin
89
 and Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia,
90
 where 
„the Court reiterated the importance of determining what constitutes an analogous 
ground by examining not only the context of the law subject to the claim, but also the 
context of the place of the group‟ with respect to „social, political and legal disadvantage 
in our society.‟91 McGolgan also highlighted this change of emphasis in the dissenting 
judgment of Madam Justice L’Heureux-Dube in Egan v Canada, 92 who, she noted, now 
placed the greater emphasis on „the effects, rather than the constituent elements of 
discrimination.‟93 However, whilst the inclusive, open-ended protection offered by the 
Canadian Charter has enabled the Canadian Court to keep pace with changing concepts 
of inequality by recognizing additional analogous grounds,
94
 such as sexual 
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orientation
95
 and non-citizenship,
96
 and the emerging jurisprudence
97
and amendments to 
the Canadian Human Rights Act in 1998
98
 (catering for intersectionality) suggest that 
Canada is as at the forefront of this field, as Sheppard observes „its concrete application 
is rare.‟99  
 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982 strongly influenced the 
development of section 9, the right to equality, of the South African Constitution 1996, 
which outlaws discrimination  
 
[…] against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, 
pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, 
disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth [and] any 
other ground where discrimination based on that other ground, causes or 
perpetuates systemic disadvantage, undermines human dignity; or adversely 
affects the equal enjoyment of a person‟s rights and freedoms. [emphasis 
added]
100
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This clearly not only provides the flexibility to address claims based on multiple and 
analogous
101
 grounds, but it is also underpinned by a substantive approach, which 
obliges the South African Constitutional Court to address the context and impact (as it 
relates to the promotion or amelioration of disadvantage) of any unequal treatment 
which may constitute a breach of s. 9(3). This, as Hepple argues, „eliminates the main 
obstacles to bringing a claim of intersectional discrimination by focusing on whether the 
way in which the claimant was treated is related to systemic disadvantage or 
undermines his or her dignity.‟102 This approach therefore negates the need to find an 
appropriate (whether hypothetical or actual) comparator, as the requirement to prove 
that the claimant was subjected to a detriment on one of the prohibited grounds should 
be sufficient, which leaves the remaining issue of establishing proof. To Hepple, the 
question of how this might be dealt with could be instructive with regard to the future 
development of EU Directives, for just as the Directives require the claimant to 
demonstrate there is evidence of direct or indirect discrimination, so the defendant must 
prove there has been no such differential treatment. However,  
 
[…] if discrimination were defined in terms of detriment, the burden of proof 
would be simply to show that he or she had been subjected to a detriment by the 
defendant; it would then be for the defendant to prove that the decision was not 
made on any one of the prohibited grounds. An inference of unlawful 
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discrimination could be drawn in the absence of a satisfactory non-
discriminatory explanation by the defendant.
103
 
 
The responsiveness of the South African Constitutional Court to accommodate 
intersectionality has been demonstrated in a number of key rulings, including Brink v 
Kitshoff,
104
 where Judge O’Regan highlighted the importance of appreciating the „acute‟ 
disadvantage experienced especially by „the case of black women…as race and gender 
discrimination overlap.‟ In addition, Justice Goldstone in Harksen v Lane NO and 
others
105
 noted there is „often a complex relationship between these grounds‟ and 
cautioned that „the temptation to force them into neatly self-contained categories should 
be resisted.‟  
 
THE WAY FORWARD 
 
The inherent essentialism or „immutability‟ which underlies the UK equality protection 
has also served to play a large part in informing the development of EU non-
discrimination law, which, as Schiek and Chege point out, has „to date…been modelled 
upon only a few jurisdictions, the UK and Netherlands being predominant.‟106 Indeed, 
they further add that – UK and Netherlands aside – the EU has leaned towards a top-
down prescriptive model, which has „tended not to be grounded in developments in and 
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adapted to the routines of national legal cultures.‟107 This in turn suggests that if the EU 
is to continue to impose an „Anglo-Dutch‟ model on the 27 Member States, which 
effectively addresses the needs of all those who do not fall into tightly demarcated and 
protected groups based on identity ascriptions, then it must rise to this challenge and 
find „ways to address complex phenomena such as multiple-discrimination in different 
circumstances.‟108  
 
In July 2008, the European Commission acknowledged the principal shortcomings of 
the Article 13 EC Directives, including their uneven material scope with respect to the 
specified „irrelevant‟ grounds, and related lack of accommodation of multiple 
discrimination, by publishing a proposal for an additional Directive addressing such 
issues.
109
 The proposal sought to extend the coverage of the grounds of religion or 
belief, disability, age, and sexual orientation to comprise the areas of social protection, 
social advantages, education, and goods and services, including housing. Yet, as Bell 
notes, this would lead to a situation which rendered gender the least protected ground, 
as „presently, discrimination on the grounds of sex is forbidden in employment, 
vocational training, aspects of social security law and the provision of goods and 
services. There is no protection against discrimination in education.‟110 Moreover, Bell 
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further highlights that the proposal also dismissed the problem of symmetry and the 
selection of an appropriate comparator issue arising in multiple discrimination claims, 
by stating that „these issues go beyond the scope of this Directive, but nothing prevents 
Member States taking action in these areas.‟111 In the meantime, as Schiek and Chege112 
point out, this therefore leaves it up to Member States, who were required to implement 
the Article 13 Directives by 2006, to develop „bottom-up‟ approaches with sufficient 
flexibility and scope to respond effectively to this challenge, and the further analysis of 
existing and further comparative socio-legal research to establish a way forward, 
notwithstanding the recent research undertaken to this effect by the Commission in 
2007.
113
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has shown that equal protection for „all‟ is a highly problematic objective 
to achieve in practice, for just as there has been an increased recognition that social 
groups are not mutually exclusive and have intersecting and fluid boundaries, there has 
been a recognition that complainants may not fall into the specified list of protected 
grounds, nor are able to frame their claims on the basis of a single ground of 
discrimination. Whilst it is clear that the development of future equality protections 
within the EU must address the plurality of individual and group needs by moving 
beyond the limitations of both the essentialist infrastructure and the formal equality 
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principle underpinning existing equality legislation, it is argued that to date the EU has 
failed to keep pace with changing societal trends and concepts of equality. Comparison 
of a range of international jurisdictions and related jurisprudence centring on the „open‟ 
and „closed‟ lists of grounds indicates that by adopting a substantive approach, which 
focuses on the context and impact of discrimination, the former – favoured by both 
Canada and South Africa – has sufficient flexibility to accommodate multiple and 
analogous grounds, and is instructive for the future development of EU equality law.  
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Abstract (please revise to 100 words max): 
The extended number of grounds for discrimination identified for protection by Article 
13 of the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, reflects the emergence and policy recognition of 
new constituencies based on identity politics, such as the gay rights, disability and older 
people‟ s movements. This trend when combined with the social (re)construction of 
their boundaries as intersecting and relational, has resulted in an EU led policy shift in 
favour of protection for „all‟, whilst at the same time retaining an awareness of group-
defined identity. Growing knowledge of the complex legal consequences of an 
increasing number of prohibited grounds, which are also intersectional, has led to an 
international debate as to where the cut off line should lie between protection for 
enumerated groups and recognition of individual differences and diversity. This has 
raised the question as to just how extensive and exhaustive such lists of grounds should 
be. This paper will examine both Canadian human rights legislation and EU anti-
discrimination legislation, and its significant expansion of protected grounds, with a 
view to evaluating first, how effectively equality guarantees, such as the new UK Single 
Equality Bill, can accommodate multi-discrimination claims and/or claims from those 
individuals/groups currently unprotected by the EU, and second, future directions 
beyond the formal equality approach. 
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